There’s only one way to prevent, not just delay, Iran’s acquisition
of nuclear weapons: reapply pressure.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, better
known as the Iran nuclear deal, will likely be the most controversial foreign
policy issue of the 2016 general election campaign for President of the United
States. President Obama considers the deal to be among his foremost foreign
policy accomplishments and leading contenders for the Democratic Party’s
nomination have publicly backed the deal. In stark contrast, all the major
Republican presidential candidates have opposed the accord and several have
vowed to scrap it if elected. Florida Senator Marco Rubio, for example, has
promised “on my first day in office . . . I am going to cancel this ridiculous
deal [Obama] has struck with Iran.” Texas Senator Ted Cruz has echoed this
position stating, “You better believe it. If I am elected President, on the
very first day in office I will rip to shreds this catastrophic Iranian nuclear
deal.”
Many others, including
within the Republican Party, believe that this tough talk is merely campaign
rhetoric, and that it would be unrealistic to suggest that this agreement,
negotiated with our closest international partners and consecrated in a United
Nations Security Council Resolution, can be easily or even ever undone.
Moreover, now that the deal has formally gone into effect, many believe either
that the value of the agreement has already been demonstrated, or at least that
it is now too established to overturn in the absence of undeniable
demonstrations of Iranian bad faith.
On both points,
however, they are mistaken. The Iran nuclear deal undermines many of America’s
most important national security objectives and will not stop Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons. The next President of the United States, therefore,
should work to unwind it. But he or she must do so carefully, with a clear
sense of the desired end state and a realistic plan to achieve it. By following
the strategy outlined below, the next U.S. President can responsibly unwind the
Iran deal and work toward a better agreement, one that prevents, not merely
delays, Iran from building the bomb. And even if a better agreement proves
unattainable, on balance U.S. interests are better served by the absence of an
agreement than by the continuation of the one we have.
Why Undo the Deal
The primary purpose of the P5+1/Iran nuclear
negotiations was to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and, while the
current deal seems certain to buy some time (but not necessarily 10-15 years of
it), it also creates two new pathways by which Iran can go nuclear. First, by
allowing Iran to keep a significant enrichment program and providing sanctions
relief upfront, the deal is structured in a way that will tempt Iran to cheat.
It can pocket the sanctions relief and then resume its march to the bomb
whenever it decides to invoke paragraph 36’s open-ended right to exit the
agreement. Second, the deal contains sunset clauses, which means that Iran can
simply be patient, wait for the nuclear restrictions to expire over the next 15
years, and then build up its nuclear program until its breakout time shrinks,
in the words of Obama, “almost down to zero.” Consistent with the terms of the
deal, at that point it can build an enrichment program so large and
sophisticated that no outside power could ever realistically intervene to stop
it from assembling nuclear weapons.
Proponents of the deal argue that if these scenarios come to pass we can simply reapply pressure, but this overlooks the fact that our means of doing so are also eroded by the terms of the deal.
As other countries increase trade ties with
Iran, they will be less willing to impose new sanctions. Moreover, as
Iran’s economy recovers, it will become less vulnerable to economic pressure. If
Iran makes a concerted push for the bomb, therefore, it is unrealistic to
expect multilateral “snap back” sanctions to stop it in sufficient time.
This leaves only the
military option, which, admittedly, the Obama Administration has not formally
taken off the table against unpredictable future contingencies. The President
has stated clearly that any U.S. president in future would
have to consider using force to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear arsenal,
if it came to that. However, the military option is also rendered less
effective the longer the deal remains in place. By providing Iran with over
$100 billion in upfront sanctions relief and lifting the UN embargoes on
Iranian trade in advanced conventional weapons and ballistic missiles, the deal
will enable Iran to improve its defenses and its retaliatory capabilities. Even
if Iran simply waits for the nuclear restrictions to expire, it will be
extremely difficult for any U.S. Administration to build domestic and
international support for military action against an Iran that has abided by
the terms of an agreement designed in Washington for over a decade. Iran could
follow the terms of this deal almost to the letter, and the deal would still
not achieve its stated objective of stopping Iran from proliferating.
There are other
problems, as well. By granting Iran, a country that has routinely defied
international law and its own past nonproliferation commitments under the NPT,
a de facto right to enrich, the deal sets a dangerous
precedent. Indeed, other countries in the Middle East and Asia are already
claiming that if Iran can enrich uranium, then they can, too. Governments want
to know why, when the U.S. government signs civil nuclear deals with a
country—the UAE comes to mind as a recent example—it insists that its
counterpart foreswear enrichment . . . after effectively blessing Iran’s right
to enrich. One can hardly blame them for asking.
Beyond the realm of
nonproliferation, by providing Iran with an influx of cash and making
Washington more hesitant to push back against Iran’s activities elsewhere for
fear of upsetting the agreement, the deal has already strengthened Iran’s hand
in the region and unsettled traditional U.S. regional partners. This has added
fuel to ongoing regional proxy wars, as in Yemen, where Saudi policy takes the
form of self-help in the perceived vacuum of U.S. engagement. This perception
has also obstructed the U.S. ability to effectively combat ISIS.
Many supporters of the
deal argue that it is a step toward a new, more normalized relationship with
Iran that could alter Iranian politics and make Tehran a more responsible
international actor. But it is possible that Iran’s reigning theocracy will use
the deal to strengthen its rule and to step up its destabilizing activities in
the region. Authoritarian regimes can be stubbornly durable, as for example in
Cuba, where U.S. policy has also probably aided rather than undermined an
authoritarian status quo. For this reason, perhaps, the Obama Administration
was unwilling to explicitly sell the deal as part of a broader rapprochement,
but within its own counsels it is likely that such a prospect played a role in
its assessments. It is of course possible that a nuclear pact will
fundamentally transform Iranian politics and policies, but no one can know that
from the present vantage point. It therefore seems a risky bet on which to
justify an agreement of this magnitude.
In sum, while
reasonable people disagree on the value of the Iran deal, there is a case to be
made that it weakens, rather than strengthens, U.S. and global security. Most
importantly, several people who might be sworn in as President next January
find the argument persuasive. What, then, is the alternative to the present
deal?
A Framework for a
Better Deal
The first step to unwinding the Iran nuclear
deal in a responsible manner is to establish a clear objective. That objective
cannot be merely to punish Iran. The goal must be to reach a better deal, one
that actually prevents Iran from building nuclear weapons.
The Obama Administration
has consistently argued that the deal’s critics will accept nothing less than
Iran’s complete capitulation, but this is not true. A deal based on the
principles that have guided U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy for decades,
and a framework that has been acceptable to many other countries with truly
peaceful nuclear programs, can in no way be fairly characterized as a
punishment.
For years, the United
States has allowed, and even encouraged, countries to operate nuclear reactors
for research or energy purposes, but it simultaneously worked to restrict the
spread of nuclear fuel-making capabilities: uranium enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing. Once a country has the ability to make its own fuel for nuclear
reactors it also has the ability to make fuel for nuclear weapons.
The vast majority of
countries with peaceful nuclear programs, such as Mexico, South Korea, and the
aforementioned United Arab Emirates, do not enrich uranium or reprocess
plutonium. Rather, they have nuclear fuel for their reactors provided to them
by other nuclear states. This is the preferred arrangement for a peaceful
nuclear program and one that Washington has promoted since the 1953 Atoms for
Peace initiative, including with its own allies. There is no good reason, therefore,
to make an exception for Iran, a U.S. adversary that has continually failed to
live up to its international commitments.
Iran should be allowed
to retain a truly peaceful nuclear program. While the details must be
worked out in negotiations, this means that Iran may be allowed in principle to
maintain nuclear reactors for research and the production of energy, such as
the Tehran Research Reactor and its light-water reactors at Bushehr. There is
no compelling reason, however, for Iran to enrich uranium or reprocess
plutonium. Iran must therefore completely dismantle its sensitive nuclear
facilities—those that can be used for the production of fuel for nuclear
weapons. That would include its uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz and
Qom. Furthermore, in addition to dismantling current facilities, Iran must
forswear future enrichment and reprocessing.
This is a reasonable
compromise that, unlike the current deal, prevents Iran from building nuclear
weapons forever. Indeed, eliminating Iran’s enrichment capability was the
Administration’s original goal of negotiations with Iran, one that was
enshrined in multiple UNSC resolutions, before it was abandoned in a desperate
search for an accord.
Critics will argue
that Iran would never agree to such limitations, having already concluded an
agreement without them. But how can they be sure? Few predicted that Muamar
Qaddafi would give up Libya’s enrichment program just days before he did so in
2003. And several years ago many serious analysts did not believe that the
current Iran nuclear deal was in the cards. Occasionally, international
diplomacy makes the seemingly impossible possible. But for that to happen in
this case, we must first set the appropriate conditions.
Returning
International Pressure on Iran
It is highly unlikely that Tehran would quickly
agree to these renegotiated terms. If it is unwilling to do so, the United
States must work to return international pressure against Iran. Time and time
again—from its agreement to a ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, to its
suspension of enrichment following the U.S. invasion of Iraq (due to fears that
it might be next), to its acceptance of restrictions on its nuclear program in
the face of tough international sanctions—we have seen that Iran only responds
to pressure.
Over the past decade,
the U.S. government has orchestrated against Iran the most intensive
international sanctions regime in history. This economic pressure brought Iran
to the negotiating table, but we erred by letting up too soon. To compel Iran
to make the concessions necessary for a good deal, Washington must work to
re-impose crippling international sanctions. To be sure, this will be much more
difficult now that the deal has already gone into effect, but, if it is a
foremost foreign policy priority of the next President, it can be done.
Indeed, the process
actually began several months ago when the Republican candidates announced
their intention to tear up the Iran deal. As a result, many international
business interests are reluctant to make major investments in Iran, knowing
that, depending on the outcome of the American presidential election, there is
a good chance that international sanctions against Iran may return in a few
short months. As Rubio said, “this should have a chilling effect for any
business thinking about investing in Iran. . . . This deal will not outlive
this Administration, and international businesses that move into Iran in the
coming months need to know they will lose everything.” Republican candidates
should reinforce this message. By making it clear that Obama’s deal with Iran
may last no longer than 12 months, they can deter the international business
community from rushing into Iran.
Next, on day one of
his or her term, the new President can reinstate by executive order any
sanctions that were suspended by the Obama Administration. He or she can also
put an immediate halt to the unfreezing of any still-frozen Iranian assets.
Finally, he or she can cease the use of executive waiver authority in order to
effectively re-instate past Congressional sanctions on Iran.
The next and most
difficult step will be working with allies and partners to reinstate
international and multilateral sanctions against Iran. Critics of this approach
have argued that the rest of the world will not support continued sanctions
against Iran, but this is incorrect.
It takes the United States,
a global superpower, to lead on issues of nuclear nonproliferation.1 Other, smaller
nations understandably focus on their narrower, often economic, interests. This
was true in 2003 when the United States began its unsuccessful, years-long
struggle to win international approval for UNSC sanctions against Iran. But
Washington demonstrated persistent leadership across two administrations and
was able eventually to win international consensus and erect the toughest
sanctions regime in history.
Now, some international business interests are eager to rush back into Iran, but only because the White House has in effect announced that Iran is once again open for business. To be sure, it will require substantial political capital, but if a new President were to reverse course and present a new plan to permanently resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis through sanctions, the world’s other key governments will again reluctantly follow. In part, they will do so for the same reason they signed on in the first place: America’s so-called secondary sanctions threaten to penalize foreign firms that do business in Iran.
In my travels to many
foreign capitals in Europe and Asia in the past year, I have been told
repeatedly that if the U.S. government were to demand new sanctions on Iran,
these governments would again grudgingly comply. U.S. sanctions force them to
choose between doing business with Iran and doing business with the United
States, and that is really no choice at all. It is perhaps not widely known,
but in building the sanctions regime that brought Iran to the table, the U.S.
approach was to target major companies first, not governments. Most of the
relevant governments were not happy with this approach, but in the end they
found it irresistible. They came around because their own private sectors did
not want to lose access to the much larger U.S. market and beseeched them to do
so.
To be sure, a
reconstituted sanctions regime may not be as comprehensive as that which
existed in 2013—at least not immediately—but it could be enough to seriously
damage Iran’s economy. By reinstating sanctions, Washington can once again
attempt to convince Iran’s leaders that they can have a healthy economy or (if
we don’t preempt it with military force) a nuclear weapons capability, but not
both.
All Options Are Still
on the Table
This approach raises the risk that Iran will
use the re-imposition of sanctions as a pretext for expanding its nuclear
program. Indeed, some movement in this direction may be inevitable, but so long
as Iran stops short of crossing red lines, the risk is manageable. To deter
Iran from dashing to a nuclear weapons breakout as we wait for the economic
pressure to build, Washington must keep all options to the table—and seem
credible as it does so.
The United States
should establish clear red lines, affirming that it is U.S. policy to prevent
Iran from producing sufficient fissile material for even a single nuclear
weapon, and that the United States will use all means necessary, including
military force, to prevent this. The new President should declare this to be
U.S. policy and ask Congress to formally endorse it. Of course, Iran may make a
reckless dash for a nuclear weapon anyway and, if so, Washington must be fully
prepared to use force to stop it. In all likelihood, however, Iran’s leaders
will be deterred. These stated red lines will box Iran in, allowing time for
the economic pressure to mount.
At the end of the day,
this plan will give Iran’s leaders a simple choice. They can stubbornly insist
on maintaining an enrichment program, but as long as they do so, they will meet
with credible military threats, their economy will be decimated by
international sanctions, and their country will remain an international pariah.
In the short- to medium-term, Iran’s leaders may choose this course. If so, we
will find ourselves in another enduring stalemate. The lack of immediate
resolution may make some people uncomfortable, but it is preferable to the
status quo, in which Iran still possesses a dangerous enrichment capability
that now comes with the international community’s stamp of approval, while the
United States gives up viable options for rolling back that capability.
A return to the
pressure track will remind the international community that Iran’s enrichment
program is in fact still a problem, and re-enlist its help in actively working
toward eliminating that program. Over time, therefore, Iran’s leaders will grow
increasingly inclined to accept the new deal Washington is prepared to offer.
As the economic pressure builds again, Iran’s leaders will return to the
negotiating table looking for relief. And they will know that in order to
receive it, they must take one simple step: dismantle their sensitive nuclear
infrastructure. Only when this is accomplished will the international community
have achieved its longstanding goal of preventing, not merely delaying, Iran’s
acquisition of nuclear weapons.
1Matthew Kroenig, “Force or Friendship:
Explaining Great Power Nonproliferation Policy,”Security Studies (2014),
pp. 1-32.
Matthew Kroenig is an associate professor of government and foreign
service at Georgetown University and a senior fellow in the Brent Scowcroft
Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council. He formerly served as
an adviser on Iran policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
